The relation of private law to the state is one of the most complex aspects of the challenges posed for the law by Europeanization and globalization. It is not only distinct from that between public law and the state; it is also not the same in different legal systems. This article provides a historical and comparative overview of this relation in Germany and in the United States. It analyses the historical conditions and reasons for which the state became the ultimate source of authority for private law in Europe but remained largely without importance for doctrinal discussions and jurisprudential decisions within private law. It also identifies some factors that can explain largely different developments in the United States, where, despite the conceptual absence of the state within private law, private law was never seen to the same degree as autonomous from social policy. On the basis of these comparative and historical observations, the article concludes with more general, theoretical remarks on some of the problems that may be seen as core aspects of the relation of private law and the state.
Everyone is talking about the challenges that Europeanization and globalization pose for the law, including private law. Yet there is remarkably little conceptual clarity about exactly what these challenges consist of. To a significant degree, such developments appear to concern the relation between private law and the state. Yet, although the general relation between law and the state is a regular topic for legal theory, the specificities of private law are often lost. Even cursory analysis suggests, however, that the relation of private law to the state is not only highly complex and distinct, it is also, apparently, not the same in different legal systems.
Nevertheless, it has not yet been comprehensively analysed; in fact, little is known of how private law relates to the state in any single legal system. This article, together with a companion piece 1 , aims to shed light on some of the issues involved. Of course, the manifold relations between private law and the state are far too complex to be analysed comprehensively in a single article, or even two. The primary aim of these two articles is not to provide answers, but to raise questions that may stimulate further discussion. Whereas the other article will structure and organize the fragmented debate in legal theory and comparative law on the impact of Europeanization and globalization, this article provides a historical and comparative background to the issues involved. Its first part identifies different perceptions of the relation of private law and the state in Germany and in the United States in the 20 th century. A second part turns to the earlier history of the relationship of the state and private law. There, we examine, on the one hand, for which historical conditions and reasons the state became the ultimate source of authority for private law in Europe.
On the other hand, we ask why the state nevertheless remained largely irrelevant for doctrinal discussions and jurisprudential decisions within private law. At the same time, we identify factors that may explain the different developments in the United States and on the European continent. On the basis of these comparative and historical observations, we conclude with more general, "theoretical" remarks on some of the problems that may be seen as core aspects of the relation of private law and the state.
I.
Comparative Perceptions
European Perceptions: The State in the Background
During much of the 19 th and 20th centuries, European scholars worked on two closely connected assumptions. One was that the validity of all law, including private law, ultimately depends exclusively on the state 2 . Nearly all private disputes discussed in academic literature had been, or could have been, brought before the state's courts, which applied, as a matter of course, a state's law. For most lawyers, this was neither a problem nor in any sense peculiar:
Was it not obvious that all law's validity depended on the state? In fact, when Hans Kelsen and Herbert Hart described the positive law's validity and identity as conceptually depending on a basic norm or a rule of recognition 3 and thus presupposing a sovereign's authority 4 , they gave expression to a common understanding. For most lawyers it was a matter of course that such a sovereign could only be a national state 5 -be it represented by legislative or judicial authorities.
The second assumption was that insofar as one looked at the substance of rules and principles guiding the relations between private individuals (private law) 6 , it was largely irrelevant that the law's validity depended on the state. Even if the state monopolised the administration of the law, private law in this sense was usually not seen as part of public governance, but as an expression of corrective justice that was largely autonomous of governmen- the great European codifications were much more a restatement meant to technically improve the law 7 than a fundamental change of substance 8 . According to a classical view, basic principles of private law claim universal validity; and the state has no legitimate governmental interests in matters of private law 9 . Thus, the sovereign could be regarded as a neutral authority to balance conflicting interests of two parties and to find solutions for conflicts that were regarded as purely private 10 .
This assumption was maintained even when the principles of corrective justice that applied to such conflicts became an object of political controversy. Obviously, in such cases modern states "intervened" into private law by means of (democratically legitimated) statutes; strict liability and consumer protection are more recent examples of such instances of private law becoming politically controversial. However, most private lawyers did not regard such debates as more "political" than earlier doctrinal discussions concerning the laesio enormis 11 or culpa levissima 12 . Even if these conflicts were politically controversial and of significant relevance for the economy and society, they all were understood by most lawyers 13 as concerning only purely private relations between private actors. Only exceptionally, when, in the heyday of the nation state, the economic constitution of society was discussed on a strongly ideological basis, did private law become the object of regulatory considerations 14 . Yet these discussions typically concerned only economic law, for only such "modern", innovative parts of private law were understood to especially shape and change the social reality 15 .
Accordingly, although influenced by changing or controversial social values, the traditional core areas of private law, such as the law of obligations, property and inheritance, were not regarded as a means of promoting social change or furthering third-party interests and collective goals 16 . At least in Europe, these latter objectives were widely understood to be the domain of public law; only in this domain was the state genuinely active in changing and shaping society. Even the regimes of the Third Reich and the German Democratic Republic soon gave up their (and their theorists') far-reaching plans to socialize private law 17 and left the structure of these core areas of private law largely in their traditional shape 18 changed its substance to a considerable (though as to its extent, disputed) degree, but these changes were brought about largely as an interpretative reaction to assumed changed circumstances in society, not through intervention by and on account of the state 19 . The plans for a "Volksgesetzbuch" failed 20 , and when East Germany finally adopted a new private-law codification in 1975, it looked very much like a modernized version of the old Civil Code 21 . Accordingly, when the law of obligations in West Germany became more "social" in the course of the 20 th century, the prevailing explanation was that the law had (more or less directly) responded to social and cultural change; apparently the state as such had no particular role to play in such processes 22 .
Today, both of these assumptions have lost their self-evident character. As a matter of fact, they offer an incomplete picture of the law in 19 th and 20 th century Europe. Private-law rules could never be reduced to a fair balancing of the interests of individual parties in a legal conflict: The ability to acquire bona fide the property of a third person or the question of how to design the legal form of business enterprises has always been guided by the public interest in a flourishing market 23 ; and the natural-law codifications were driven to a significant degree by an impulse to further the common good 24 
American Perceptions: Instrumentalism without a State
Interestingly, the American legal system has experienced a remarkably different development.
On the one hand, even in the times of legal formalism, the distinction between public and private law was of less normative significance than on the European continent 28 . Although there is wide disagreement over what these ends should be, there is fairly little doubt that private law must be understood and evaluated in light of these ends. Indeed, even a decision like Lochner v. U.S. 32 , now universally decried as an outburst of both judicial formalism and a false preference for an autonomous private sphere over valid public concern, is really based on the weighing of public concerns -on the one hand "the interest of the state that its population should be strong and robust" 33 , on the other "the ability of the laborer to support himself and his family" 34 . Justice Holmes made clear that the decision concerned conflicting instrumental theories when he wrote, in dissent, that "a Constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether of paternalism and the organic relation of the 27 However, whereas progressive legal realists and theoreticians of the New Deal connected these social ends explicitly with the state 36 , today these policies are apparently not derived from or connected with the political domination of the state. Instead, legal academia and, to a lesser degree, the courts have bound themselves interdisciplinarily to other social sciences, especially to economics, including public-choice-or game-theory 37 . Besides following precedent, judges are expected to implement moral norms based in and policies favoured by society, and even when they make decisions based on official policies, they do so not because these policies are official but because they have the sufficient social support 38 . Indeed, it seems plausible that the common law in the United States, other than in continental Europe, is thought of as based in society rather than in the state. Paradoxically, it appears that whereas European private law is based on the state but not subordinated to the state's instrumental ends, private law in the United States is subordinated to such ends, but these ends (and the law's validity) are not found in the state.
Misperceptions? Transnational Private Law and State Instrumentalism
Recently, this paradoxical difference has changed fundamentally: On the one hand, the state is apparently retreating from the legal system 39 . Thus, private lawmaking has become increasingly common, both within the national legal systems and on a transnational level, and in areas as diverse as labour law, accounting standards, good governance, and sport 40 . With the rise of party autonomy in choice of law it has become usual business for parties to choose the law they wish applied to their cases; thus the applicability of a nation's law is subordinated to a private choice. In a parallel development, national courts are regarded more and more as just one option besides international arbitration, which since 1950 has gained an increasing degree 35 of autonomy from national legal systems 41 . Lawyers have started to act and think transnationally 42 . Thus, the intense debate about a modern "lex mercatoria" 43 may be understood as an expression of the feeling of many of the participants that an international body of law or legally binding custom is emerging, in addition to and independent of the legal systems of national states 44 .
In a parallel development, legal scholars have begun discussing doctrinal problems and systematic questions of private law as being independent of national legal systems 45 :
"Principles" of European and transnational law have emerged 46 ; they may be seen as an expression of the feeling that the foundations of private law can -or even should -be understood as independent of a nation's laws 47 . Even judges are increasingly prepared to transgress the national borders of their legal systems and accept foreign judgements or international sources as authoritative. Much debate focuses on human-rights adjudication in which this is now commonplace 48 ; in this context, a relevant factor may be the feeling among judges, or within their audiences, that human rights protect citizens against the state and should therefore be understood as an autonomous body of non-state law that is developed and justified in transnational discourse 49 . If similar developments can now increasingly be seen in private law 50 , this suggests a possible, though implicit, similar assumption that private law emerges from transnational discourse 51 .
On the other hand, state instrumentalism seems to be on the rise. In the United States, the rise of regulatory statutes is deplored as an intrusion of the state into the common law 52 .
At the same time, the European Union (in this respect acting like a state) is more and more adopting an "American", instrumental approach to private law 53 : it increasingly uses privatelaw regulation for pursuing public goals. In consequence, the state becomes an "invisible party" to legal proceedings between private individuals 54 . Consumer law is a telling example:
From a traditional perspective, as represented by Europe's different national legal systems, consumer law aims to protect "weak" consumers against dominant or even unfair business enterprises 55 ; such law is based on a corrective-justice approach to private law. Modern European directives on consumer law, by contrast, are drafted to create and protect a common European market. They aim to further competition and trade and for this reason create convenient conditions for everybody to participate in this market 56 53 f., 212 ff.: "domination" is different from "power", as it is defined "as the probability that … commands … will be obeyed by a given group of persons"; it is normally based on "the belief in legitimacy". psychological role may go beyond "domination" in various ways. "Domination" nonetheless yields specific insights for a historical perspective, since it not only identifies core aspects of the modern relation between private law and the state, but it applies as well to other forms of government, like chiefdoms, ancient city-states, or empires.
Yet the idea of "external" domination over private law is not simple and evident, but complex and difficult to grasp: It presupposes a pre-existing field of private law onto which the external actor is thrust, be it the official of the government of an ancient city, a sovereign monarch, or the state. Thus it is assumed that private law can be thought of "prior to", and independent, of such public authority. Private law in this sense is no more than the system of rules guiding the relations between private individuals 61 . Now, domination can express itself in two forms that are, at least conceptually, rather different. First, the external authority can be seen as a disinterested and thus neutral sovereign or judge. In this case, private law continues to be thought of as independent of any external -public or private -interest. Domination in this sense expresses itself only in the monopolisation of the creation and administration of private law; it is based on the external authority's control over decisions within the field of private law. In the second form of domination, the external authority can actively pursue some external -individual or collective, private or public -interest by means of private law. Normatively, it thus becomes a third party to private transactions. An example is European consumer-law directives drafted to further the common market 62 .
Although both aspects of public domination over private law may come together, from an analytical and -as will be shown -from a historical perspective, they are independent of each other. On the one hand, full sovereignty may not be necessary for private law to be used as a means for pursuing collective goals, and, on the other hand, a sovereign who has fully monopolised private law may remain in a neutral, disinterested position. Thus, public domination over private law should not be equated conceptually with an instrumental, regulatory approach to the law. Instrumentalism and monopolisation of the law are independent aspects of public domination and shall be treated as such in the analysis that follows. Thus, private law may either be independent of any public domination, or it may be determined by some external dominator. Such domination may express itself either in the monopolisation of law creation and administration (to varying degrees), or in a political instrumentalisation of private law, as contrasted with a non-instrumental, corrective-justice approach. 61 On the concept of private law see supra N. 6. 62 Supra at NN. 54 ff.
II.
Historical Observations
Lawyers, Magistrates, and Emperors
Historical stories of private law typically start with Roman law 63 , and, indeed, Roman law is probably the most important origin of the tradition of Western private-law thinking 64 . By contrast, the origins of the modern state's administrating and controlling private law might more adequately be traced to a much later stage, when the Catholic Church established itself as a legally structured, hierarchically organised society and thus developed the modern ideas of sovereignty and independent lawmaking 65 Roman lawyers were normally reluctant to discuss abstract questions, like "sources" of the law or even the relation between private law and public domination or government. They were more interested in the discussion of concrete cases; theory was outside the scope of their business 66 . Yet they had to know where to find the law, and here Gaius told Roman students in the second century AD that it was preferable to speak of the laws of the Roman people in the plural (iura populi Romani). These laws consisted not only of the statutes (leges), the plebiscites, the Senate's opinions (senatus consulta), the Emperor's decisions (constitutiones principium), and the edicts of the magistrates, but also of the opinions of legal scholars (responsa prudentium) 67 . Thus, different elements or "layers" of the law that had developed at different times were meant to complement or even correct each other 68 ; accordingly, they were conceived of as normatively independent of each other 69 . Hence, the law's validity was neither related to a "state" as such nor -at least until Justinian put the law into a new, com-prehensive corpus iuris 70 -to the general will of a "sovereign". It was the product of different and independent actors. Such a plural system of legal sources may prima vista be explained by the fact that the Roman jurists never really developed a modern concept of the state; conceptually the Roman "state" was still identical with the Roman people (Populus Romanus) 71 . True, towards the end of the Republic the Romans had come rather close to adopting the idea of a separated state 72 .
It was possible to speak of the res publicae Populi Romani, and the Populus Romanus could as such acquire rights and duties; in fact, the magistrates acted for the Populus Romanus 73 , much as the prosecutor in today's United States represents "the people". Yet, in later times, domination was attributed personally to the emperor, not to an abstract government of the Populus Romanus 74 . Furthermore, even at the end of the Roman republic, Roman lawyers proceeded from a plural conception of their legal sources, which adequately presented the law as the product of different groups or actors within the legal system: Of course, the jurists believed that the XII Tables, the first Roman law and core of the ius civile, was a basic, integrative legal text for the Roman people as a whole 75 . But the senate's opinions represented primarily the Roman nobilitas or the political establishment; conversely, the plebiscites had been furnished with legal force in order to grant the plebs a balancing means of expressing its will in legally binding form. Even more importantly, the law had long been administered and developed outside the government: Priests, not legislators, advised parties about the dates on which to take legal actions or about the correct, effective formulation of legal proceedings, last wills, or contracts 76 . Later, this tradition had been continued by private iuris consulti, learned jurists, who devoted their lives to the law. Within a few centuries they developed a specific legal language and transformed the still archaic law of the XII Tables into a highly 70 complex body of legal learning 77 based on methods of Hellenistic scholarship and remembered in voluminous textbooks. As result, at the end of the Republic this "privately produced" lawyers' law was largely independent of governmental domination and thus autonomous of the political system 78 .
Nevertheless, the government had maintained means of controlling -loosely -the law's administration and influencing the law's substantial development. Thus, the senate continued to issue senatus consulta, authoritative senatorial opinions that, though technically not legislative acts, immediately became part of the legal system. A well-known example is the senatus consultum Vellaeanum that for purposes of public policy prevented women from interceding 79 . Even more important was the magistrates' control of the legal administration.
According to the rules of the formulary process 80 , the praetor or the aediles, high magistrates in charge of the legal administration, were authorized to decide whether an action or exception was granted in a concrete case. Thus, they assumed a decisive role in the development of the law's substance by adopting new actions into their edicts, annually announcing the actions and defences they were prepared to acknowledge.
These magistrates were high officials of the government, and they were clearly acting as such. Even if most of them were probably unable individually to formulate the highly technical texts of their edicts and in this respect had to rely on professional advice of private iuris consulti 81 , it would be wrong to infer that they were mere representatives or a "bridgehead" of the legal community within the political sphere 82 . Adopting a new formula and granting an action remained governmental decisions, and many of these formulas expressed interventions into the legal system based on public policy. Thus, the (modern) "aedilitian remedies" for defects of sold goods have grown out of an equally specific and pragmatic edict of the aediles, which ordered the notoriously ill-reputed slave-traders to inform potential purchasers of any was the only person who could possibly proceed against the bad habits of his tenants. And when a freeman had been killed, the action was treated as an actio popularis, which meant that everybody was entitled to claim the penalty for himself 88 .
Yet despite such political intervention into the legal system, and despite the formal governmental control of the law's administration, Roman law has become famous for the high degree of autonomy from political government it had gained by the end of the Republic. In fact, the praetors were never able to fully control the law's development; to a large degree, they simply acknowledged earlier developments within the privately developing legal system, as expressed in the collective expertise of the iuris consulti 89 . This autonomy of the law resulted from its scholarly, self-referential development in the hands of iuris consulti, who were both economically independent and not part of the political classes 90 .
Such autonomy was not acceptable for the emperors, who accordingly tried to take control of the legal system. Thus, from early on, the emperors had allowed extraordinary appeals against decisions in the formulary process, and a new, "extraordinary" procedure admin- from public concerns was necessary for private law to become autonomous from governmental domination, or whether the concern for private interests and the sociological-institutional autonomy of this lawyer's law were parallel only by historical chance.
A Plural Legal World?
Although Roman law was based on a plural system of independent legal sources, from a procedural point of view, it was unified. As long as the praetor controlled the administration of justice, a choice between different courts was excluded as a matter of principle. Likewise, when the cognitio extra ordinem was later introduced as a procedure to acknowledge actions that were regarded as desirable but that would have been refused by the praetor, this introduction did not really create two independent systems of private law. Rather, in the cognitio extra ordinem the sovereign emperor was seen as modifying and further developing the republican state of the law 111 ; the introduction of the new procedure signified a shift of the legal system's centre of authority from the praetor to the emperor.
In sharp contrast to such a model of a coherent legal system, legal historians have drawn a totally different picture of the European legal order between the 12 th and the 16 th century 112 -a legal order said to bear significant similarities to the increasingly plural legal world of our times that is characterised by conflicts between independent courts applying different gestio is often understood instrumentally as a motivation for altruistic behaviour; cf. Jeroen Kortmann, Altruism in Private Law (2005) 91 ff., 99 ff. Although this understanding can be traced back to Justinian's Institutes (3,27,1), the classical Roman lawyers did not think so. For them, the negotiorum gestio did not more than to acknowledge existing pre-legal social duties to help one's friends ("officia amici" legal rules and principles 113 . Instead of a unified legal system, it is said, the old European order was a plurality of legal systems that conflicted with each other. Every individual was subject to the local statutes of the city or to the customs of the place where he lived; as far as private law was concerned, these local laws were embedded into the increasingly universal ius commune 114 . At the same time, everybody was subject also to universal Canon law. The Catholic Church claimed extensive general jurisdiction for all causae spirituales, matters then regarded as inherently "spiritual", such as family law (because marriage was a sacrament), the law of succession, and even contract law (because contracts were typically confirmed by oaths and the church claimed jurisdiction over pledges of faith) 115 . Furthermore, noblemen were subject to feudal law, and peasants were subject to manorial law. Many artisans had to obey to the local statutes and customs of their guilds, and merchants did their business according to a supposedly universal "lex mercatoria".
Yet the degree of this pluralism should not be overestimated. Feudal law was quite early integrated by legal scholars into the ius commune 116 . The most important source were the Lombard libri feudorum of the 11 th and 12 th centuries that combined a restatement of customary feudal law with some important imperial enactments 117 . At the beginning of the 13 th century, this text had been included into Justinian's Novels and thus became a part of the corpus iuris civilis. At the same time, feudal rights were explained in terms of quasi-Roman property law (dominium directum and dominium utile) 118 . Thus, at least at this time, feudal law could no longer be regarded as an independent legal system. Likewise, the guild's statutes were easily integrated into the legal systems of cities. What is more, the different local and territorial laws -customary or written -were expressions of the complex political order; their relation was thus determined on a quasi-constitutional basis and by means of the theory of statutes, a predecessor of modern private international law 119 . Accordingly, as long as claims to jurisdiction were not politically contested, the multiplicity of legal sources did not necessarily result in genuine conflicts in the sense that independent courts would claim jurisdiction for the same cases and apply different laws with divergent results. Thus, it might be misleading to describe this legal world in terms of a genuine pluralism of conflicting, independent legal systems; at least in theory 120 , it bore perhaps more similarity to an integrated federal system.
By contrast, the relation between Canon law and secular laws was far more complex 121 . Apart from jurisdiction over causae spirituales, there was a broad range of other bases for the church's jurisdiction 122 . In particular, the church claimed broad jurisdiction ratione personarum -not only over clerics, but also for travellers, members of universities, Jews in disputes with Christians, and for miserabiles personae, such as children or widows 123 .
Attempts to clearly limit the provinces of Canon and secular law proved not very successful 124 ; in fact, quite often, even in criminal law, a matter was regarded as falling into a "mixed forum", a jurisdiction of both secular and ecclesiastical courts. Such cases might be decided simply by the first court into which it was brought 125 . Additionally, however, the church also claimed jurisdiction ex defectu iuris. Appeal against a secular court to an ecclesiastical court was allowed if the secular judges had violated principles of justice 126 . Thus, genuine conflicts of jurisdiction must have become a daily experience, and not only in unusual, international, or politically contested cases.
In addition, even secular law exhibited a genuinely plural structure-at least if claims that a lex mercatoria existed as an independent transnational system of commercial law are 119 true. Yet, despite some treatises on a "lex Mercatoria" between the 13 th and the 17 th centuries 127 , whether such a system in fact existed is strongly disputed 128 . The dispute is perhaps less the historical matters of fact, however, than to their conceptually correct interpretation. In the late middle ages, commercial cases normally fell into the jurisdiction of commercial courts.
These courts consisted typically of merchants, not professionally educated lawyers, and they were largely, though not fully, independent of governmental or ecclesiastical control 129 market" 132 . But of course this did not mean that all relevant common and local law was excluded. To the contrary: The ius commune was normally the basis for decisions of the courts of merchants; the common law was described as the "mother of mercantile law" 133 . Nevertheless, the ius commune was routinely modified according to the merchants' needs; this is at least how the learned lawyers perceived the matter 134 . A suitable device for achieving the desired results was the idea of mercantile equity (aequitas mercatoria), allowing exceptions to the strict law 135 . Thus, in deviation from the Roman ius commune, merchants were not allowed to raise the exceptio nudi pacti, according to which a "naked", unwritten, agreement could not be enforced before a court 136 . Furthermore, in addition to different local and international customs and to the common law or ius commune, mercantile law was determined by numerous written local sources: statutes of the guilds and towns, on both procedure and substantive law, and by privileges of towns or princes granting special rights to marketplaces and to travelling merchants 137 .
Such findings are open to interpretation and debate: Did mercantile courts decide on the basis of "law", or was it just "equity", based on customs? 138 What would have transformed commercial customs into genuine law? The modern answer, acknowledgement or incorporation by the state 139 , was not available because, even conceptually, there was no legal monopoly before the modern state created one. For such customs to be regarded as law, would it be enough for there to have been an acknowledgement that typical forms of contracts were valid and could be used for interpreting incomplete agreements? Or would it rather be necessary that specific forms or contents of contracts were regarded as obligatory 140 ? Parallels to discussion about a modern "lex mercatoria" 141 are apparent. By contrast, another alleged property of a modern lex mercatoria -its transnational character (i.e., absent "nations" in the modern sense, its independence of local polities) -finds no real parallel in history. If "transnational law" refers to a legal norms applied everywhere in the world, then mercantile law was no such transnational law, since it was based primarily on the local customs and privileges of towns and fairs. Any "transnational" character consisted in a basic intellectual and normative similarity, a similarity grounded in a common understanding of what commerce was about and what was regarded as fair trade.
A final and perhaps more important question concerns the ambiguous idea of "independence" of legal systems. If independence presupposes an autonomous Grundnorm or a "rule of recognition" 142 for the legal system in question, it becomes difficult to clearly classify the lex mercatoria as "independent", given the difficulty to situate its normative basis in the market or in the common law. If, alternatively, independence presupposes that the relevant norms, customs, and concepts constitute a complete "body of law" that is intellectually and normatively independent of other legal systems and of non-legal systems of norms and belief, lex mercatoria does not qualify, since it was based largely on the common law. If, finally, "independence" is based on differences in substance, then not even Canon law would have constituted an independent legal system, since it has always been assumed that Canon law was based on the Roman ius commune ("Ecclesia vivit iure Romana") 143 and on Christian truth.
Apparently, "autonomy" and "independence" are classificatory alternatives; a legal system is either independent or part of a wider system. Such an alternative might be insufficient or even misleading for understanding the late medieval legal order; perhaps it is more appropriate to describe legal (sub)systems as more or less independent viz. more or less integrated. Then, the mercantile law might be viewed as more integrated into the ius commune than was Canon law, but less than feudal law. Accordingly, the late medieval legal order could perhaps be presented as a network of mutually connected, but not wholly integrated, subsystems of the law. Such a picture would raise further, highly interesting, questions about the concept of law and the idea of legal validity. Today, the law's validity is typically explained monistically -integrated via the state's authority 144 . In contrast, to describe medieval law it may be necessary to develop a genuinely plural conception of legal sources.
How did the lawyers and other legal decisionmakers of these days manage the uncertainty resulting from such relative independence of different legal subsystems? Answers to these questions may be helpful also for understanding more recent developments -not, of course, be- 142 Cf. supra N. 3. 143 "The Church lives according to Roman Law"; see Helmholz, Canon Law (N. 115) 17 ff. 144 Supra at N. 5.
cause medieval concepts and instruments should be applied today, but because they could free modern lawyers from the unconscious conceptual constraints that result from later developments 145 .
The "Lothar Legend": Legal Authority and the Emperor's Sovereignty
Commercial matters have at most times been brought before specific mercantile courts, and merchants were typically a part of these courts. Nevertheless, since the 16 th century these leges and custom.
The authority of Roman law was a different matter. Medieval lawyers treated the corpus iuris civilis as a "holy book" 150 : an eminent text containing eternal legal truth. In its revealed authority, it was put on the same level as the Holy Scripture and the classical philosophical texts of Plato and Aristotle (as far as these were known). Its authority resulted from an idealised view on the Roman Empire as the cradle of European civilisation 151 and from the specifically juristic rationality inherent in its texts: it was "natural law historically confirmed and metaphysically validated" 152 . However, it did not follow that Roman law was generally applicable. At least in theory (though not always in practice 153 ), written municipal law had priority, and the Roman ius commune was only of subsidiary applicability 154 . It was not so much a set of rules applied uniformly before the courts than a common academic language.
Justinian's Corpus iuris civilis was the authoritative textual point of reference of common juristic knowledge 155 . Accordingly, the validity of Roman law could not be explained on the basis of a concept of ideal, "natural" law. Natural law was a different concept; it did not refer to a transcendental ideal, but to a loose bundle of binding, yet not always directly applicable norms, such as the Decalogue 156 . At the same time, Roman law was also different from equity (aequitas). This was a further, independent source of law based, again, on a different source of legal authority; it has been seen in the treatment of mercantile custom 157 .
What is more, even if there is apparently little historic knowledge in this respect, the different sources of legal authority may have been connected with different policies. Whereas the Roman sources largely proceeded from an implicit corrective-justice approach to private law 158 , medieval statutes were typically written for more instrumental considerations of public policy. Accordingly, they did not provide for a comprehensive codification, but were limited 150 to matters of particular importance for the social and commercial order of the community 159 .
Thus, quite different ideas and sources of legal authority or validity were present in the legal world of the late Middle Ages. It followed that the authority of legal sources could only be relative to that of others 160 . For contemporary lawyers, such a situation of uncertainty resulting from plural and relative authority cannot have been satisfactory. The conflicting authorities mutually qualified their respective authority 161 Yet, despite the central place of the state in modern concepts of law, neither the motives for this fiction nor its consequences have been fully analysed. Instead, since the 17 th century, the controversial debates of the reception as such of Roman law 174 have put this problem into the shadow. But the modern relation of private law to the state cannot be understood without a clear picture of the factors that led to the idea that legal validity could derive only from external domination and thus from the sovereign, the ultimate secular authority.
Finally, even in the 16 th and 17 th centuries, the sovereign monarchs or cities did not exhibit a particular interest in comprehensively determining the law. True, they had reduced the impact of Canon law and had monopolised the judiciary 175 . And an increasing number of statutes was issued regulating matters of public policy 176 . But this legislation concerned mostly matters of public law 177 ; and -apart from criminal law 178 -there was no comprehensive, codificatory legislation until the 18 th century 179 . Private law continued to be based on the Roman texts of the ius commune and on local statutes. Thus, the appearance of the state was arguably irrelevant for the substance of private law and even preserved the private law's autonomy.
Sovereignty and Validity I: Codification and the State
Over the course of the 17 th century, the validity of the law had become a fundamental problem for the legal system. On the one hand, the story of Emperor Lothar III's having enacted the Digest as positive law was irrelevant outside the borders of the German Empire. In 1643 it was buried as a "legend" in Germany as well, when Hermann Conring published his book "De origine iuris germanici". On the other hand, the validity of the applicable "positive" law was now becoming more and more closely connected with a sovereign's will. In the 18 th century, even customary law was reconceptualized as law tacitly agreed on, and thereby made valid, by the sovereign 180 It was only at this stage that European legislators appeared on the scene and actively 181 extended their sovereignty into the domain of private law. On the continent, private law was, within a remarkably short period, comprehensively codified 190 . Thus, it is prima vista highly plausible to regard codifications as an expression of the "strong state" 191 . Indeed, codifications were initiated by the governmental administration and thus originated in the political sphere. Interestingly, they were first successful only in strong states; but the form of government was irrespective for the codification projects: The law was codified in the still- Nevertheless, codifications have also been described as "a specific historical phenomenon that originated in … legal science" 192 . In fact, it is remarkable that common-law systems have proved strongly resistant to codification 193 . Therefore, in order to understand the role of the state in the codification movement, it is necessary to look to the motives leading to codification that were apparently manifold and complex. The first was a mixture of pragmatic and theoretical considerations. The whole legal system was in need of fundamental reform and of a unified legislative foundation, not only because the present plural and insecure state of the law was highly unsatisfactory, but also because the normative status of Roman law as a source of positive law had become untenably awkward. This was partly due to the second factor -the (assumed) need to rationally reorder and systematise private law. In fact, in the increasingly rationalistic world of 18 th century, Roman law lost its previous status as legal ratio scripta that had long been a major rationale for its application: Reason had to be simple and evident for every clear mind, but Roman law and the civilian legal science were complex and full of apparently unnecessary controversy. Reason had to express itself in general propositions, i.e. abstract laws, but the digest was full of the subtle discussions of individual cases.
Already in the 17 th century, this had been a motive for humanist and natural-law scholars to 190 On the history of the idea of codifying the law and of the codification projects, see rearrange and rationalise the traditional private law into new systems of legal order 194 ; thus, Leibniz had proposed an ideal codification that could logically reorder civil law 195 .
What is more, rationality and the idea of a system had become the foundation of natural-law thinking. In the 17 th and 18 th centuries, authors like Grotius, Pufendorf, Thomasius, Heineccius, and Wolff had transformed the traditional Christian school of natural law into a secular enterprise. Assuming that moral and legal truths are accessible for human reason, they developed logical, conceptually structured systems of natural law on the basis of a limited number of basic moral principles. Thus, the systematic structure of the law had become much more than a device of expository convenience. It was a matter of moral principle.
Although these natural-law systems were not thought to be directly applicable, they All in all, the codification idea was originally motivated by a bundle of highly divergent factors. What is more, it was in the 19 th and 20 th centuries connected with new political values, especially with the democratic ideal of the law as an expression of a people's will. It is doubtful, though, whether any of these moral ideals has ever been achieved: First, codifications today are not written by legislators and often not even by administrations, but by commissions of scholars and other legal experts. A democratic legitimization of the codification idea may therefore be regarded as artificial. In fact, even today the codification idea appears to be still connected with the natural-law intuition that the law can be "found" or "constructed" by abstract legal thinking (and therefore needs no democratic consent). Accordingly, it is reported by participants that current proposals for new "principles" of European law are occasionally written before the comparative research had been done 201 . Second, codifications have never made the law accessible to laymen outside the legal system. Even if the myth is true that every Frenchman used to carry his Code Civil with him, it is unlikely he understood it. In fact, already the enlightenment's legislators proceeded from the assumption that additional instruments were needed to make the codified law known by the general public 202 . And finally, even the more reformatory codifications did not fundamentally change the law: One of the main aims of codification has always been to restate the law simply 203 ; accordingly, the courts have mostly just continued earlier lines of jurisprudence 204 . The legal system has thus retained large parts of its autonomy. Of course, governments influence the development of private law by means of legislative intervention; this has been seen above with respect to the European Union's directives and the Roman magistrates 205 . But codification has never fully shifted the development of private law from judges and scholars to the government. It follows that -as long as the judiciary is not conceived of as one aspect of a homogenous, metaphysical state 206 -private law may be seen as largely independent of the state even today, despite its formal incorporation into the state by means of codification. This brings us back to the initial question of the relation of the state and the legal system in the codification process. If this question is answered from a more formal perspective, it might appear decisive that the codifications replaced the plural legal sources of the late usus modernus by a single state law; the codification movement would thus be described as a process of the states' expanding their domination into traditionally autonomous areas of the legal system 207 . However, codification might likewise be understood as a primarily internal legal process by which an external source of legal validity is established without the legal system's giving up its internal autonomy. Seen from this internal perspective, the state might perhaps not have meant much more for the legal system of the European nation state than did the Roman praetor for the Roman republic 208 . However, the exact historical relation of internal legal and external political factors has not yet been sufficiently analysed. Such analysis is necessary not only for a complete picture of the historic development but also for understanding the relation of the state and private law today. A comparison of the different developments in continental European and in the common-law world might well help with this analysis.
Sovereignty and Validity II: the People and the Common Law
Even today, the relation between the state and private law appears to be significantly closer on the European continent than in the common law. This may be due not least to the common law's having always remained in the hands of judges who developed a high degree of independence from the state and a strong collective professional identity. Although the courts had everywhere become a part of the centralised administration of the state (or, in England, of the crown), the judiciary had -in varying degrees -retained some sort of independence against the political government 209 . Even where the courts enjoyed no formal, constitutional independence 210 , judges were able to protect individuals against absolutistic arbitrariness 211 . They parison of the divergent codification processes on the European continent and in America is specifically helpful for understanding the relation of private law and the state.
Basically, the reasons offered for codification in England and America were similar to those in continental Europe 222 . It was argued that a codification would make the law more accessible and structure it in a rational way; its application would thus become efficient. Influential lawyers, especially Bentham, emphasised the function of a codification to promote social change towards a better society 223 . Furthermore, codes could have been seen as an expression of the American revolution; indeed, such arguments seem to have been important in early codification attempts in 17 th century Massachusetts 224 . Why then, it might be asked, were these arguments ultimately less successful in the United States?
Standard answers are that codifications were regarded as unsatisfactorily inflexible;
often the quality of a proposal was argued to be low. Common lawyers had always mistrusted the parliament and its legislative ability. Parliamentarians were opposed to social change. Politically influential lawyers were likewise conservative, and they may have had political interests in preserving the present state of law that was the basis of their professional identity and livelihood 225 . But the inflexibility of codes has not prevented European legislators from codifying the law even in the 20 th century, and lawyers were no less conservative and selfinterested in civil jurisdictions than in English and American ones. Other reasons for the success of the codification-movement on the European continent and not in the common law may have been more decisive.
A first reason is apparently that neither the English nor the American legal order was plural in the same degree and sense that made the peoples on the European continent suffer from legal uncertainty 226 . The differences between law and equity, between admiralty law and common law, were real, but probably less pressing than the differences among legal sources in Europe. Second, the prevailing common law was never seen as an alien, foreign system, as was the case with the Roman ius commune in the 17 th century. In England and America, there was never an emotional distance from the prevailing legal system. To the contrary: Common lawyers identified with the common law 227 ; and the sharp attacks against the common law by 222 But see W. Teubner who argues that different weights were attached to similar arguments. But this underestimates both the impulse for social reform in continental Europe and the desire for a rational order of the law in England and the United States. 223 W. Teubner Bentham, the leading proponent of codification in England, may in turn have resulted in a fundamental distrust of the codification movement as a whole 228 . Interestingly, identification with the common law also happened in the United States, where, from around 1800, American common law was perceived not as a received body of alien English law, but as the customary law of the American people 229 .
Connected with this observation is, third, the different role of judges on the European continent and in the common-law world that might have accounted for the different attitudes towards legislation. Whereas the French revolution used codification as a governmental bulwark to protect the people from a corrupt judiciary 230 , the objective in the common-law world was to protect the people through the courts from a corrupt government. The same desire for democracy and liberty may thus have turned into an argument for codification on the continent and against it in England and the United States and so ultimately provided a significant difference in the respective relationships between private law and the state.
For the present analysis, a fourth factor may be the most interesting one: The common law's legal validity was always thought of as independent of the state 231 . This may seem doubtful for England, where the common law was developed by the common-law courts that in turn derived their authority from the King 232 , and the King was actively engaged in the law's development by the introduction of remedies in equity by the King's Court of Chancery 233 . Yet, even if the common-law courts derived their authority from the King, the law they applied was thought to be found rather than made, and to bind the King, as well 234 : To overcome the law, the King had to resort a body of rules outside law, namely equity.
In any event, when the United States rejected the sovereignty of the English Crown, the common law they received was thereby stripped of such foundation in the will of the (English) Crown. American lawyers apparently never felt another positive source of law was needed for lack of the common law's legal authority. This is not to say questions of the law's validity were not raised. To the contrary: In a remarkable historical parallel to the civilian development 235 in America in the 17 th and 18 th centuries, the validity of customary law was related to the sovereign's will. Yet, as far as we know, this created neither conceptual nor prac-common "consciousness" or "spirit" of the people (Volksgeist). The only difference appears to have been that the Volksgeist had been expressed by scholars, while the "national standards of justice" were now collected in the precedents of the common law 242 . Yet, as Mathias Reimann has observed 243 , this idea was much more congenial with the American legal mind and its original common-law tradition than to the German legal culture that was based on "foreign" Roman law and that had long regarded the state as the legal sovereign. Thus, whereas Savigny ultimately limited his argument to the claim that German law was not yet ripe for codification (and indeed such Codification did come about later), Carter had no such grounds to qualify his argument, and the New York codification project ultimately failed.
This defeat is today regarded as a crucial event within the development of legislative codification in American 244 . A desire to authoritatively systematise and unify the law, however, has remained. It found a different expression in the restatements. As a purely private enterprise, these left the authority of the common law untouched. At the same time, they were conceptually and factually open for the law's development. They did not claim to authoritatively fix the law, but, less pretentiously, to reconstruct it with an authoritative text. As result, it was natural for the restatements to get out of date. They are periodically reformulated and thereby -substantially and systematically -adapted to the changes of the law 245 .
All in all, different concepts of sovereignty are arguably one basic reason for the different role of the state in modern private law. Yet the idea of private law's being based on a sovereign people's will or consciousness is perhaps even more a fiction than the concept of a state comprehensively dominating the law. It served to defend, on the one hand, the law's autonomy and, on the other hand, the interests of the elites of learned lawyers 246 . It is thus an interesting question, why, at some stage of Western legal history, a general consensus developed that the law conceptually needed some external source of authority, called sovereign. At any rate, the consequences of introducing such an external sovereign were complex: Conceptually, this amounted to a loss of the autonomy of private law. Yet, originally such an introduction of a sovereign was a fiction that helped preserve the factual autonomy of private law.
Only in more recent times, it may, perhaps ironically, have paved the way also for a factual loss of autonomy. As a matter of fact, in the course of the last 150 years, the state has become more and more active within private law; and in view of the state's legal monopoly, it is diffi- 242 247 . Only now, it appears that sovereignty over private law is shifting from the people to the state.
The State, Society, and the Public/Private Distinction
Modern writers reconstructing the development of the distinction between private and public law typically proceed from a political understanding of the public/private divide. They understand the idea of an autonomous private law as representing specific liberal (or libertarian 248 ) values such as individual autonomy, freedom of contract, and an absolute concept of property.
According to this theory, the bourgeois society constituted itself against the increasingly powerful state in the 18 th and 19 th century 249 . Liberal writers argued that private law was immune to governmental intervention; only the realm of public law was open to political decisionmaking. In matters of private law, the legislator was restricted to describing a supposedly neutral, apolitical "natural" law based on historically developed principles of justice 250 . The division became entrenched in the legal system only as result of a certain political debate, when liberals sought to protect "society" against an increasingly dominant "state" 251 .
Of course, this theory is highly plausible and contains an important truth: The distinction was indeed politicized in this sense; and the earlier secular natural law had often assumed an instrumental understanding of private law 252 . Furthermore, this theory may help to explain the different approaches of the common and the civil law towards the public/private divide. In England, the bourgeois establishment had achieved participation in the government as result of the Glorious Revolution; it did not need a sphere of immunity against the government 253 .
Indeed, whereas German thinkers traditionally conceived of the state as an independent entity with abstract value in itself (Hegel) 254 , the Anglo-American world saw the state simply as the product of society without an independent being or intrinsic value 255 .
Nevertheless, it is doubtful whether this is the complete story. On the one hand, there may be more mundane reasons for the sharp divide in Germany, in particular the fact that different courts are competent for administrative and private matters. Since the 17 th century, the state's administrative acts had increasingly been regarded as immune to judicial review; this development culminated 1806, when -as result of the end of the Holy Roman Empire -individuals lost their traditional constitutional protection against local governments 256 . Thus the judicial review of administrative acts had to be newly established, leading to specific administrative courts 257 . This institutional separation probably entrenched the academic division of public and private law as fundamentally different subjects -a division that had resulted from the fact that, after the 16 th century, the constitutional frame of the Holy Roman Empire had to be developed independently of the Roman sources, which continued to be the point of reference for private law 258 . As result, even today, it would be impossible in Germany to hold a chair for administrative law and torts. An academic teacher is expected to be either a public or a private lawyer. All in all, there are strong sociological reasons for the sharp divide between public and private law thinking in Germany that on the one hand put the division beyond question and, on the other hand, prevented private lawyers from seeing private law as a means of public concerns.
On the other hand, the thesis that politics and the state were behind the distinction is doubtful in view of its pedigree. The distinction was present in Roman law without a comparable political implication 259 . Of course, the distinction had lost much of its relevance as long as European societies were largely feudal. Under the feudal system, the king did not directly dominate his people: Domination was mediated by intermediate vassals, and feudal relations were based on the ideals of voluntary consent and reciprocity 260 . These relations relied on principles of corrective justice; in fact, domination was legally conceived of in terms of prop-erty (dominium) 261 and thus in notions of private law, to which the public/private distinction was unsuited 262 . The difference between an individual's power over his possessions and the prince's power over his vassals and subjects was only a matter of degree 263 .
Yet these feudal structures of the European society began to vanish before the state and the idea of a homogenous society, as opposed to the state, appeared on the scene. As early as the 14 th and 15 th centuries, the first monarchies had developed in Sicily and in England as forms of direct domination between the prince and his subjects 264 . Apparently in response to these developments, it was soon generally recognised that different principles applied to such relations on the one hand and to relations among citizens on the other. This awareness is apparent in discussions of the distinction between distributive and corrective justice. Although this distinction had been authoritatively stated by Aristotle and Aquinas, neither referred to different social relations 265 . As far as we know, it was only Cardinal Cajetan, a leading representative of the late scholastic school of Salamanca, who in 1518 reconstructed this distinction as representing vertical and horizontal social relations. Whereas corrective justice guided the relations among citizens, principles of distributive justice were directed at a person representing the "whole" (society, or the state) distributing social benefits and burdens among its "parts" (citizens, or subjects). Conversely, the "parts" were guided by the principles of legal justice (iustitia legalis): the obligation to obey the law 266 . This was an expression of the intuition that sovereign domination makes a fundamental difference from a normative, legal point of view: Different principles apply to the public and to the private sphere. Within few years, and before the modern concept of a state 267 and the idea of a private society had been developed, this transformation of the Aristotelian doctrine had become generally accepted 268 , and it has continued to determine all future discussions and legislation 269 .
Accordingly, although secular natural lawyers often proceeded from an instrumental view into private law, they clearly separated it from public law. Thus, Pufendorf, in his "De iure naturae et gentium" first treats private relations in the status naturalis -such as tort, contract, and property law 270 -then proceeds to private relations of domination 271 , before concluding with public 272 and administrative law 273 . Apparently he regarded the different areas of the law as sufficiently distinctive to deserve separate treatment. The instrumental concept of private law does not make its specific foundation in corrective justice irrelevant. Private liability for negligence is justified on the basis of a preventive, penal consideration that will reappear much later in the economic analysis of law: Without such liability, citizens would not refrain from selfishly causing damage to each other 274 At the same time, Pufendorf did not think that private law should be immune to public regulation. Many questions of private law were not finally determined by natural law and were therefore left to the sovereign's discretion 275 . Thus, a full understanding of the idea of private law as autonomous against public intervention requires tracing the equating of private law with the (equally fundamental) intuition of Western lawyers, held by civil and common lawyers (albeit in different ways) that certain principles of the law are beyond governmental discretion 276 . At any rate, a full understanding of the public/private-divide will be enhanced if its different historical layers of normative meaning are disentangled.
What is more, independently of any political argument, such as defending society against the state, the distinction between corrective and distributive justice may be a sufficiently important from a normative point of view, to retain the distinction between public and private law. True, private relations can never finally be determined without distributive considerations of public policy 277 : The law of tort/delict distributively assigns protected interests and determines the extent of individual responsibility (strict liability vs. liability for fault) 278 .
Contract law distributively decides for all citizens of a legal order which interests should be protected against other citizens. But such distributions concern bipolar relations that are normatively structured by corrective justice. They are different from distributions like those of tax law that are independent of such bipolarity. It might therefore be too rash to discredit this distinction altogether as politically conservative.
III. Concluding Remarks
All in all, these observations show that from a historical point of view, many questions re- 
Sovereignty, Validity, and Authority
The historical survey has shown that the idea of basing the validity of private law on some external sovereign was always somewhat fictional: Neither the American people nor the continental European states, as represented by governments, could ever comprehensively control the private law's development. Besides government, academics and judges remained important actors. Thus it might be possible to conceive of legitimate private law without roots in external sovereignty. Indeed, basing all validity monistically in one sovereign is perhaps not very helpful when the law becomes transnational; 279 such a concept is of limited usefor conflicts between different national and transnational legal systems. Now, private law without a state may be seen simply as a kind of natural law 280 . Indeed, this idea is again present in the debate of a lex mercatoria 281 and among the proponents of a European civil code 282 . Yet, for a new natural-law approach, more would be needed than a somewhat naïve belief in eternal legal values; and even if the idea of natural law does not Systematic thinking within a codified legal order, however, aims at finding and, at best, developing an authoritatively imposed system within the law 295 ; it is part of the applicative hermeneutic process of interpreting a sovereign legislator's command 296 . Accordingly, codifications tend to ossify the systematic assumption of the times of their enactment and thus may become an obstacle to adequately describe the law's development over time. Although individual legal rules can be changed (relatively) easily by legislation or by judicial development 297 , to replace a traditional legal system with a new one has proved difficult and often even impossible. As a natural consequence, tensions emerge between the codification's implied systematic structure and the changing values and rules. Thus, the systematic assumptions implicit in codifications may create serious problems for legal reasoning and for the judicial development of the law 298 .
If the law should remain responsive to such a change of values, or if such change is inevitable (as the history of codified law suggests) 299 , it may be preferable to leave the task of system-building to academia and limit the legal competences of democratically legitimated legislative bodies to normative decisionmaking. In the end, the questions of how to formulate doctrine and systems should be decided by more "scholarly" criteria intrinsic to the law -like technical precision, adequacy, and internal coherence; these criteria are largely independent of political authority. In this way, juristic knowledge could again become independent of national legal systems; the development of a European jurisprudence formulating "principles" of European law 300 can be seen as a step into this direction 301 .
These are questions not for the past but for the present and for the future; they are questions central to debates of Europeanization and globalization. Yet this article has shown, on the one hand, that these questions are the result of a specific historical development: There is no "naturally given" relation between private law and the state. On the other hand, it has become apparent that these questions are not simply the fruit of totally new tensions between private law and the state, either. Similar questions have occupied the minds of lawyers for centuries.
Accordingly, the article has shown a couple of answers given in the long and winding history of German and US law. Obviously, these answers cannot simply be copied; our period is different from those that came before it. At the same time, to ignore these debates in answering the questions of our time would mean to dispense with centuries of experience that we have with these, or similar, questions. Even more importantly, our modern questions are often not fully understood if they are not seen as resulting from specific, partially contingent historical developments. If this article has succeeded in making this historical background of the modern debates more accessible, it has served its aims.
